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# **Empowering Common Africans and Democratizing Chieftaincy: Voluntary Rural-Rural Migration**

**Veronica Ehrenreich-Risner**

## **PREPRINT SUBMISSION NOTE:**

The manuscript text of this preprint is identical to the manuscript text submitted to a peer-reviewed academic journal for consideration on July 31, 2022 at 12:03am Pacific Standard Time (PST), except that the References and End Notes have been de-anonymized so that this manuscript may be cited properly by other scholars.

## **MANUSCRIPT TEXT:**

Since majority rule (post-1994), a major focus of the South African government has been re-enforcing the roles of traditional rulers, while also introducing a democratic component to chieftainship. In a recent forum, a participant asked the following question:

*What does [your work] add to [our] understanding of what has transpired since 1994 with respect to traditional authorities?*<sup>1</sup>

The author responded that in order to understand the merits of the current system of traditional councils, one must first understand how *ubukhosi* (chieftainship) was manipulated to serve the needs of the past governments, as this past informs the institution's current state. The system of

Bantu Authorities (BA), legislated by the Bantu Authorities Act 68/1951, was a form of traditional rule of *amakhosi* (chiefs) overseen by European Bantu Affairs Commissioners, generally known as “indirect rule”. However, the system of BA did not originate from nothing. Rather, the system of BA evolved from earlier forms of indirect rule, the earliest of which has been addressed at length by preeminent scholar Norman Etherington who has examined the origins of “indirect rule in Natal” honed by Theophilus Shepstone, diplomatic agent and secretary for native affairs 1846-75.<sup>2</sup> Similarly, Aran MacKinnon has scrutinized the later changes to indirect rule in the early 20th century, prior to apartheid. His work on the Zululand Land Delimitation Commission (ZLDC) is especially salient to the discussion of indirect rule in the former reserves of today’s KwaZulu-Natal.

INSERT: Fig. 1 Author’s representation of BA system for Bantustans and Mthunzini District.

These scholars’ work, *inter alia*, on the subject of indirect rule laid the foundation for my own work on Bantu Authorities, which examines in great detail the system of BA enacted under the apartheid government and offers analysis of today's system of traditional rule as the successor to the system of indirect rule inscribed under the wider system of BA. (See Figure 1 which depicts the hierarchy of the BA system.) While today's system of traditional rule has been enacted under a non-racist majority rule government, the powers and structures delineated in the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41/2003 (TLGFA) largely mirror the system inscribed under BA. Granted, terms have been renamed. “tribal authorities” are now named “traditional councils” and “regional authorities” are “regional councils”, but the modern system

of traditional rule is still overseen by the central government, now through the benevolent Ministry of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA), and its Department of Cooperative Governance and Department of Traditional Affairs, which replaces the apartheid-era Department of Bantu Administration and Development (DBAD). Furthermore, the tools available to these departments for influencing a chief, such as giving money to a chief or favoring one successor in a succession dispute, largely remain the same.

In understanding the majority rule government's decision to re-appropriate the structures of BA for modern traditional authorities, it is necessary to examine the system of BA and its precursive structures. These structures continue to impact today's governance of the former reserves and further engrain the legacy of poverty. While it is vitally important to know "How we got here?" the present is of urgent concern. As Mamhood Mamdani asserts, rural citizens of South Africa remain subjects of their inkosi.<sup>3</sup> Generally, the focus of the majority-rule state has been on shoring up communal land rights (Communal Land Rights Act 11/2004 – CLaRA) and democratizing the powers of the chief through elected local councilors. The latter aspect of democratizing chieftaincy is the lens by which this paper evaluates structures of the past, although this author uses historical analysis to offer different means for achieving this goal.

Knowing the history of poverty and subjugation in the former reserves, today's majority rule state faces what this author terms "the rural dilemma". This dilemma includes questions such as "How to develop the reserves?", "How much to fund the reserves?", and "When and how should the state seek to override the power of traditional rulers?" Even today, these questions lead even the most knowledgeable administrators to grave uncertainty.

This article seeks to resolve a substantial amount of this uncertainty by taking a different approach. Instead of considering the “rural dilemma” from the perspective of present structures and perspectives, this article instead scours the history of traditional rule to see if there were answers that existed in the past. Then this article asks how those answers of the past can be applied to solve South Africa’s current “rural dilemma.”

In this author's search for answers, one point stood out above all else. In precolonial times, the power of chiefs was checked and balanced by their subjects’ ability to migrate and change allegiances. I offer this possible solution to the “rural dilemma” of today: *invest in the rural African’s ability to voluntarily migrate between chiefs*. By empowering common rural Africans to voluntarily migrate between chiefs, a standard behavior in precolonial times, democracy may naturally occur. Given that common rural Africans are poor, funds would need to be provided in the form of grants administered by a funding agency, such as CoGTA’s Department of Traditional Affairs.

Below, the author offers analysis based on the work of Aran MacKinnon, Norman Etherington, and other scholars, to show that the common rural African’s ability to migrate between chiefs was the predominant historical non-violent means of democratizing chieftainship, and based on its proven efficacy in the past, the best option to pursue today for achieving that same objective. Specifically, this article centers on what Aderanti Adepoju’s term “rural-rural migration,” to which I add “voluntary” to denote the importance of agency in the decision to migrate.<sup>4</sup> Formal support for *voluntary rural-rural migration* opens up a fresh avenue for a way forward in the former reserves.

As Adepoju contends, “The major cause of voluntary movement of populations between and within national borders in recent years is rooted in the initial and growing disparity in development between and among states.” Migration, he adds, involves at least three major actors: the migrant, the area or country of origin, and the area or country of destination. In the case of common rural South Africans, the actors are the *common rural African*, the *current chief*, the *destination chief*, and the *funding agency*.

To explain the critical importance of voluntary rural-rural migration in the history of south eastern Africa, this article now offers a brief history of the subject by time period. For each time period, the author highlights examples of migration that occurred in the former reserves, how that migration benefitted rural commoners, and how forces beyond the control of these rural commoners gradually constricted their ability to voluntarily migrate. In the past, commoners could migrate freely, granting them agency and control over their own lives. But centuries of colonization eroded that ability, leading to the situation today, where people are stuck in poverty in the former reserves under the rule of a chief who is often less than responsive to their needs.

## **THE HISTORICAL OPTION TO MIGRATE BETWEEN CHIEFS – JOHN LABAND**

Historian John Laband asserts that “the power and fortunes of . . . chiefs waxed and waned with the number of adherents they could attract to their banner.”<sup>5</sup> As a commodity, precolonial chieftainship must have provided sufficient incentives and reciprocity to retain adherents, who given the option, could move to a neighboring chief during precolonial times. Historically, the market economy of chieftainship relied much more on the adherence of a base of loyal followers

than on the power to allocate land. Etherington shows in the precolonial era that land was not demarcated, as chieftainships were mobile when conditions dictated.<sup>6</sup>

Laband elucidates a second point when he contends that “no chiefdom was bound inexorably to a particular territory and its members might easily migrate elsewhere in search of security, accumulating or shedding, adherents as they moved.”<sup>7</sup> Hence, while commoners migrated between chiefs, so too did chieftaincies, not yet locked into a certain territory, migrate to find better circumstances. Neither chief nor his adherents north of the Tugela River were demarcated into a certain “reserve” or territory until the 1902 Zululand Land Delimitation Commission (ZLDC). Aran MacKinnon eloquently explains the efforts of the ZLDC to meet the demands for land of both the white settler and the rural African, significantly constricting voluntary rural-rural migration with the demarcation of “tribes” and their respective “native” reserves.<sup>8</sup> Colonialism through the ZLDC and apartheid through BA codified the boundaries of chiefdoms, and in so doing constricted the land space for chiefly allotment to the rural African.<sup>9</sup> In 2014, acting chief Mjabulaseni Dube shared his recurrent dream during apartheid where he cried because he had no land to give his people: “The whites ate the land.”<sup>10</sup>

Despite the reality that the ZLDC boundaries generally remain in place, common rural Africans who *hlonipa* (show respect to) a chief are not *legally* restricted in majority-rule South Africa from moving from one chief to another who better meets their personal needs. However, the ability of common rural Africans to voluntarily migrate is *practically* restricted by the general lack of funds and other forms of support for doing so. A history of voluntary rural-rural migration is evinced by oral history, journals, and government documents in the following discussion.

## **PRECOLONIAL MIGRATION 1500-1850 – MAX GLUCKMAN**

Social anthropologist Max Gluckman contextualizes the “Rise of the Zulu kingdom” through journals and oral history.<sup>11</sup> Following Vasco da Gama’s rounding the Cape of Good Hope in 1497, many European ships were wrecked on the coast of Natal. The journals of some of these castaways survived which relate their experiences with the local people who were recorded as “a great number of small independent tribes organized around kinship groups.”<sup>12</sup> Gluckman cites one journal that states a chief visiting the castaways was “escorted by only 50 warriors or so; the force of attackers on less happy occasions was never more than 300.” According to Gluckman, seven castaway journals corroborate that “the parties were attacked either in years of widespread drought or after the invasion of locusts, when food was short among the natives.” Conversely, Gluckman attests in “good seasons and after the harvest the people came dancing to meet the Portuguese, and freely offered food for the scarce metals.”<sup>13</sup>

The survivors of the Dutch vessel *Stavenisse*, wrecked in 1686 south of today’s Durban, wrote in a journal, “The natives, indeed, offered us bread and cattle for sale, . . . . For nails, bolts, and other ironwork of the wreck, we, indeed, got some bread and corn . . . they had sometimes fully a thousand armed men, they had everything in abundance, while we suffered from want.”<sup>14</sup> Gluckman concludes that the early Natal tribes had rules of compassion, yet the people fought if conditions were poor or an individual group was starved for metal needed to forge their tools and weapons.

While the Portuguese castaways wrote of “small independent tribes under kinship groups,” the Dutch castaways cited groups of up to one thousand in size. Gluckman explains that the “tribes were well-organized societies with elaborate codes of law and ethics” . . . and “offshoots of the Bantu stock” who displaced the indigenous pastoral Bushmen.<sup>15</sup> Gluckman observes that Shaka's rise to power was probably the result of “tides that had been running in the life of the African peoples for two centuries,” namely, the tides of population increase in Africa’s interior; emigration from the interior that crowded Natal’s pasture lands; and increased contacts with European settlers and traders.<sup>16</sup>

Gluckman examined the ostracism Nandi Bhebhe faced when she bore Sigidi kaSenzangakhona (aka Shaka), which informs this discussion of the existence of the rural-rural migration pattern in the precolonial era. Shaka was an illegitimate son to Senzangakhona kaJama, the chief of the small Zulu group under Dingiswayo. Senzangakhona would father three Zulu kings: Shaka, Dingane, and Mpande. Gluckman writes that, Nandi “was hurried into a disgraced marriage with her lover.”<sup>17</sup> After Shaka’s birth she bore a daughter to Senzangakhona (Nomcoba), but she and her children were ill treated and not accepted by the tribe. The option of migration in the early 1800s is evinced in Senzangakhona’s act of driving her away, which triggered two more of Nandi’s consecutive rural-rural migrations.

Nandi returned to her people, the Mhlongo of Elangeni, leaving Shaka behind with his father, where he suffered constant ridicule from his half brother. Nandi sent for Shaka but life with the Mhlongo family proved dangerous. In this second migration, Nandi sought to protect Shaka from assassination. According to Gluckman, Nandi and the children wandered about finally settling at the Mthethwa people where they were well treated. Other oral accounts state

that Nandi and her children suffered an interlapping migration.<sup>18</sup> After leaving her Mhlongo family, her second migration, she stayed with the Qwabe people with Gendeyana, with whom she married and had a son, Ngwadi. But Nandi and her family were not accepted and the third rural-rural migration to the Mthetwa people under chief Dingiswayo set the history of the Zulu people in motion.

The Mthetwa welcomed the family and Shaka grew to become one of Dingiswayo's bravest warriors. Although Nandi was a single mother, she was of royal blood, so more options were likely available to her than the common African. Still, the ability to migrate between chiefs was what empowered Nandi to protect Shaka and her family.

Additionally, before colonialism, flexibility of land use allowed the chieftdom and its members to migrate in search of security. According to Gluckman, "their rising numbers placed a steadily increasing pressure on the resources of each tribe's territory. Sections of the tribes accordingly moved away to better lands and to independence."<sup>19</sup> So, not only individual migration, but also group migration, was common practice at that time.

## **CHIEFTAINSHIP IN EARLY COLONIAL NATAL, 1843-1879 – JOHN LAMBERT**

As argued above, formal government support for the voluntary rural-rural migration of rural Africans evokes the role and power of chieftainship. John Lambert examines the evolution of the institution of chieftainship through the micro study of colonial Natal from 1843-1879.<sup>20</sup> As Lambert argues, "A particularly far-reaching measure resulted from the colonial concept of chieftdoms as "tribes", a concept that was accompanied by a tighter territorial definition of

chiefship . . . .” This concept, he continues, “arose from the attempt to confine chiefdoms to clearly-defined geographical areas with all Africans in an area under one chief.”<sup>21</sup> As Etherington asserts, precolonial Africans identified themselves by the chiefs they *khonzed* (paid tribute to), not by the territory.<sup>22</sup> But the colonial office wanted Africans immobilized for ease of administration and conflated chief and ward under one term, “tribe.”

In 1843, the British Colonial Office annexed Natal, the land between the Tugela and the Mzimkhulu Rivers. Sir Theophilus Shepstone served as diplomatic agent (1845-53) and later as secretary for native affairs (1853-75) and developed the Shepstone system of indirect rule to serve the colonial intention of segregating all Africans onto demarcated tribal lands.<sup>23</sup> Given the white settlers’ antagonism to African reserves only seven reserves were demarcated, and with the least desirable land. In the late 1860s, reserves were demarcated beyond the Mkomanzi River, for a total of two million acres. Still, the reserves could only accommodate half of the African population and the colonial intention of separate development was deprioritized until apartheid. Yet, several mechanisms were put in place between Natal’s annexation and the Anglo-Zulu War that destroyed Zululand as an independent nation. These mechanisms would in turn obstruct the common African’s ability to migrate voluntarily.

Most importantly, in 1849, an Order in Council established a separate administrative system for the Africans of Natal.<sup>24</sup> Although the colonial office acknowledged the authority of chiefs, it also appropriated and relegated the powers of chiefs as subservient to that of colonial agents under the rule of the Lieutenant-Governor, deemed the Supreme Chief over the Africans, who could appoint and remove chiefs, to be overseen by “on the ground” magistrates as Administrators of Native Law. In 1863, the colonial office further emphasized the status of

chiefs as government servants by providing nominal salaries, which distorted and confused the role of *ubukhosi*, who served both as guardian of his people and as servant of the colonial office.<sup>25</sup>

Mechanisms evinced by 1879 relevant to this article on migration are sevenfold: 1) the encroachment on chieftainship powers by colonial rule under magistrates; 2) the assignment of criminal jurisdiction to magistrates; 3) the repurposing of chiefs as tax collectors and labor suppliers for the colonial office; 4) the deposing of “unloyal” chiefs and the appointment of new chiefs loyal to the colonial office; 5) the demarcation of lands for chiefs and adherents; 6) the appointment of non-hereditary chiefs, and 7) the compensation of chiefs for their role as servants of the colonial office. The above processes limited the power of chiefs and, in turn, restricted the common rural Africans ability to migrate voluntarily.

Against the onslaught of mechanisms instituted to containerize their people, initially, the personal agency of chiefs remained strong. Yet as land evaporated and Shepstone pushed for “closer settlements,” deploying harsh reprisals for chiefs who ignored his orders, in time chieftainship was molded into the colonial framework of indirect rule.<sup>26</sup> Instances of note that show common rural Africans retained some choice in matters of migration included their refusal, despite Shepstone’s insistence, to move to “closer settlements.”<sup>27</sup> Given that the crown would not sufficiently fund administration of Africans in Natal, Shepstone improvised, playing one chief off of another, and at times tolerating African disobedience, as he had no army to back up his orders. Lambert states that “the 18<sup>th</sup> century chiefdoms had been fluid communities with an ill-defined jurisdiction in which *imizi* (homesteads) had been bound together by neighborhood, kinship (real or fictive), clientship and marriage.” He adds that chiefdom groups were fluid and

capable of “embracing people who were prepared to adapt or manipulate their traditions of origins...to claim kinship links...hence, membership of the chiefdom.”<sup>28</sup> In a recent debate, Etherington contended that precolonial Africans defined themselves as belonging to a particular chief not as belonging to the colonial concept of a “tribe.”<sup>29</sup>

Africans migrated as circumstances dictated, as evinced by the “constant stream of refugees into the colony from the Zulu kingdom. While many came as small groups, others were organized and powerful chiefdoms . . . .”<sup>30</sup> Although Shepstone attempted to restrict chiefdoms to a defined area, Africans migrated when needed. To shore up chiefly powers, “Shepstone recognized the right of chiefs to allocate land to their people. Within the reserve allocated to a chief, only he could allocate the land that was held under communal tenure.”<sup>31</sup> Hence, the ability of the common rural African to migrate was obstructed and required *khonza* be paid to the new destination chief.

Lambert acknowledges that chiefs needed to attract followers, which implies rural Africans’ ability to migrate between chiefdoms. He asserts that hereditary chiefs drew the largest following not only because of the resources at their command but because these chiefs “regularly consulted with their leading *abanumzana* [homestead heads]. . . for the interests of their people.”<sup>32</sup> Such chiefs employed the *sisu* system that enabled wealthier men with herds of cattle to build a patron-client relationship with poorer men “by allowing them the use of some cattle.”<sup>33</sup> In this way chiefs were able to attract members of other chiefdoms to their fold, which evinces a reciprocal relationship between the chief and his/her adherents remained intact. Popular consent was still required for a chief to rule who otherwise “risked seeing people transfer their allegiance

elsewhere.” In the colonial era, a chief’s “reputation for being a better and more just leader” attracted followers who would migrate away from chiefs who meted out ill-treatment.<sup>34</sup>

Ultimately, Lambert concludes that the 1850s remained a time of fluidity in Natal between chiefs and adherents, as neither settlers nor administration were secure enough to assert authority over Africans, who ignored colonial summons. But that would soon change, as “the colonial concept of chiefdoms as tribes” was accompanied by a “tighter territorial definition” of boundaries of chiefdoms, where such boundaries were intended to restrict African mobility.<sup>35</sup> By defining the geographical area for each chief with all Africans under that chief restricted to that area, the colonial office intended to end voluntary rural-rural migration and containerize the people for ease of administration. But as land was scarce, people continued to migrate as needed for resources, and the colonial office was unable to enforce its dictums.

In addition, to tighten the territorial definition of chieftaincy, the colonial office further obstructed the ability for common Africans to migrate when it instituted the hut tax which burdened the already impoverished rural African. The hut tax tethered chiefs to the colonial office by making them tax collectors, thus further poisoning the relationship between chiefs and their subjects.<sup>36</sup>

## **PRECOLONIAL MIGRATION MAPS OF THE 19<sup>th</sup> CENTURY– N. ETHERINGTON**

At a recent debate, Norman Etherington argued that only the institution of chieftainship has a place in history, not “tribe,” a construction created by imperialism for its own convenience. A frequent case of confusion was the “practice of people calling themselves by the names of the

chief or king they followed.” While European cartographers thought in terms of “tribe, folk, nation, Africans thought in terms of leadership wielded by genealogically conscious chiefs.”<sup>37</sup>

In *Mapping Colonial Conquest*, Etherington sorts the beginning of the story of how, before its conquest of South Africa, Britain “mapped tribes” in cartography that would later underpin the logic of separate development that fixed ethnic identities under apartheid.<sup>38</sup> In examining the role of early colonial cartographers in perpetuating misinformation on Africans, Etherington cites the origins of the multiple mechanisms that would come together a century later in the system of BA.<sup>39</sup> Through the use of maps, Etherington delineates how colonial powers used cartography to create social formations of identity and culture where there often were none. He contends that the artificial colonial mapping of ethnicity was usually based on faulty cartography that depicted tribal affiliations which “record a series of cross-cultural misunderstandings.”<sup>40</sup> Groups were temporary and loosely connected under an agreed upon leader. Yet, the colonial office codified these groups under the created term “tribe” to pigeonhole migrating Africans into a category for control and ease of native administration. (See Figure 2. G. W. Stow, “Sketch Map of Central and Southern Africa, Showing the Main Lines of Migration” (1880).) According to Etherington, “the most arresting features of the work are the discreteness of the population groups depicted and their incessant movement.” Stow’s map is ideologically loaded. Etherington argues that “His [Stow’s] primary objective . . . ‘is to prove the great antiquity of the Bushmen in South Africa’.”<sup>41</sup>

Etherington, with his use of early maps, illustrates that precolonial Africans did not live in discrete “homelands,” but instead migrated as needed, and that groups did not unify permanently under one chief, but instead re-aligned their allegiance according to individual

preferences.<sup>42</sup> As Europeans constituted 13% of the population to Africans 87%, under segregation and subsequently apartheid, the South African state avoided the politics of race by dividing Africans into ethnicities under the divide and rule paradigm. In regards to the government embarking on its “policy of fragmenting the African population,” Etherington proves there was “some quite remarkable efforts to place tribes on maps with a precision unknown to the sloppy cartographers of the nineteenth century.”<sup>43</sup> Etherington cites the cartography of N.J. van Warmelo, chief ethnologist for the Department of Native Affairs, as an example. (See Figure 3 showing *ubukhosi* from van Warmelo’s map of the Zululand chieftainships.) Etherington assesses the map: “It could hardly be bettered as an illustration of the ethnic fragmentation promoted by apartheid ideology.”<sup>44</sup>

Of critical note, the rural Africans’ ability to migrate between chiefs provided leverage in their dealings with traditional African leaders. By needing to gather followers, as opposed to the colonial and apartheid states’ mandated containerization of common Africans under the concept of a “tribe,” a precolonial chief was required to provide reciprocity, which functioned as a form of democratic insurance for common Africans.

INSERT: Figure 2. “Sketch Map of Central and Southern Africa, showing lines of migration”<sup>45</sup>

INSERT: Figure 3. Insert of a portion of van Warmelo’s map rotated and retouched by author<sup>46</sup>

## **THE ZULULAND LANDS DELIMITATION COMMISSION 1902-4 – A. MACKINNON**

Aran MacKinnon asked at the same forum, “What is today’s function of chieftaincy?” He answered his own question, “Land allocation and ceremonial rites”. But before the Zululand Lands Delimitation Commission (ZLDC), belonging, loyalty, and reciprocity were the functional ties between the traditional ruler and his/her followers as subjects migrated and did not stay in one place. The demarcation of reserves, with wards for each chieftainship, drastically changed the dynamics of chieftainship and of the relationships of the chief to his people and of the people to the land, and as a result, rural-rural migration was greatly curtailed.

With only the colonial office’s vague term of reference for the ZLDC to delimit sufficient land making allowance for the natural increase of Zululand’s African population, the ZLDC promulgated complete segregation of African and European land and demarcated 21 reserves for Africans.<sup>47</sup> Arguably, the only non-white group to benefit from the delimitation was the Dunn progeny, to which the ZLDC allocated 10,000 acres of land in Reserve 7A of Mthunzini (formerly Umlalazi) District.<sup>48</sup> European settlers in Natal were eager to grow sugar cane and pushed for the best lands on the coastal belt of the Lower Umfolosi District and the Hlabisa District, as well as Mthunzini District, followed by the Ubombo and Ingwavuma Districts. The Natal Ministry, pushed by white settler pressure, encouraged the ZLDC to continue to delimit land after completing its initial task without waiting for instructions from the British imperial government or Natal’s secretary of state. Due to complaints from Natal’s white community, reserves were adjusted to exclude “African occupation that occurred on flat open lands” and substituted with lands that were “broken and not so well adapted for European occupation.”<sup>49</sup> (See Figure 4 for an example of the rolling landscape of gumtrees in former reserve 10.) Furthermore, the commission included a wide strip of land on either side of coastal rivers for

white occupation which prevented “Africans from expanding their grazing or settlement areas onto lower coastal lands.”<sup>50</sup>

MacKinnon unpacks the work of the ZLDC and its impact on rural Africans, which included restricting Africans in their regional movements and prohibiting voluntary rural-rural migration without the consent of their chief and the colonial office. The ZLDC restricted access to fresh ground virtually ending crop rotation and cut up ancestral lands with swaths of land for white settlers, another cause for the loss of regional mobility for rural Africans. He argues that “constraints imposed by the Natal government . . . undermined Africans ability to develop the limits of traditional land occupation.”<sup>51</sup>

Additionally, the colonial office restricted Africans free use of Crown Lands outside the reserves.<sup>52</sup> Africans were relegated to land use and occupation on a traditional basis only, which impacted all sectors of African society, including *kholwa* (Christian-educated) and exempted Africans. The commission only informed Africans of its objective and “pointed out the delimited reserve areas,” largely without accepting or considering any African evidence.<sup>53</sup> Hence, when needed, Africans voluntarily migrated to Boer farms in Zululand where they were forced to pay not only the British hut tax but an additional rent to the white farmer. Another alternative for voluntary rural-rural migration was crown land outside the reserves. In 1903 the Natal government instituted a £2 squatter’s tax on Africans occupying crown lands outside the reserves. No security of tenure was offered.<sup>54</sup>

In short, a form of voluntary rural-rural migration continued, but it was highly constricted and expensive. Additionally, the ZLDC recommended that “all Africans remain under the jurisdiction of their chiefs, *even if they lived outside the reserves* [author’s emphasis].”<sup>55</sup> In so

doing, MacKinnon argues that the commission diminished the power of *ubukhosi* “as chiefs were unable to maintain their authority with all the district changes and land being thrown open.”<sup>56</sup>

Along with land dispossession, other factors impacted Zulu society. The exile of Zulu paramount chief (king) Dinizulu and a series of natural disasters put Africans in harm’s way making Zululand vulnerable to the greed of white settlers. The 1897 rinderpest outbreak, MacKinnon highlights, facilitated the expropriation of Zululand for white farms. C.B. Saunders, one of two ZLDC commissioners, reported to the delimitation commission that Africans had lost most of their cattle and would, therefore, require less land for grazing.”<sup>57</sup>

A contentious issue, states MacKinnon, was the African’s right to buy land outside the reserves. Africans wanted to buy land for various reasons, *inter alia*, to secure their ancestors graves and to protect their homes from interference. The ZLDC received numerous applications for land from Africans to meet the needs of their expanding population. But due to the manipulation of the Natal government, “Africans in Zululand were prohibited outright from purchasing land either on a communal or individual basis” which put an end to this form of voluntary rural-rural migration; a precursor to the 1913 Land Act.<sup>58</sup> As a result, some areas in Southern Zululand were so overcrowded that Africans migrated to the Transvaal and onto Boer farms, despite having to pay both hut tax to the government and hut rent to the Boer farmers. Finally, white farmers had to accept “that no more land could be thrown open . . . without causing a serious disruption to Africans.”<sup>59</sup> Ultimately, whites knew that they would need a supply of local cheap black labor to work their farms. MacKinnon suggests that the ulterior motive in these delimitations was a desire to avoid any wide scale disruption to African society that might precipitate a rebellion.

What had been the fluid movement of Africans in independent Zululand was circumscribed with the demarcation of twenty-one reserves cut through with white farms that impeded regional mobility and voluntary rural-rural migration. As depicted in Figure 3, white-owned gumtree and sugar cane plantations break the continuity of the Mthunzini Reserves no. 9 (Mkhwanazi/ Mzimela/ Nzuza/ Zulu) and no. 10 (Mkhwanazi/ Dube). These non-contiguous reserves would prove a serious problem for the apartheid government during consolidation of the ethnic homelands. MacKinnon contends that few of the reserves were contiguous with one another and this had the effect of restricting the mobility of Africans as they were isolated by large corridors of white land.

Although advantageous conditions varied amongst districts, “by 1903, Africans were applying to leave Umlalazi [Mthunzini District in 1907], Eshowe and Nkandla due to the lack of available good lands and complaints of food scarcity.”<sup>60</sup> Despite the demarcation of reserves in 1904, these documents show that voluntary rural-rural migration was still possible, but that Africans now needed to apply to the colonial office for permission to move from one chief to another.

MacKinnon relates that the ZLDC sought to tie all Africans to their chiefs, as even those outside the reserve remained under the jurisdiction of their chief. The commission felt that “to free such people from tribal control would be fraught with dangerous consequences.”<sup>61</sup> Shortly after the delimitation, European cane farmers moved into Umlalazi forcing Africans to migrate. Chief Lokotwayo Mathaba negotiated with the magistrate and was able to forestall the removals for a year and people were able to reap their crops.<sup>62</sup> In the case of *kholwa* Africans, Saunders was biased and directed that “Natives, when moving from one district to another are not allowed

to sell the premises they vacate . . . .” He further stated that all *kholwa* Africans on open lands were subject to traditional African authority.<sup>63</sup> In short, Africans could voluntarily migrate *but* at their own expense and they remained tied to their chief.

MacKinnon states that besides *kholwa* Africans, those Africans living near or on crown land forests were subjected to restricted use of the land with the delimitation and tightened forest regulations. If forests fell within a reserve, the commission claimed to provide “sufficient portions of the forest to meet the requirement of the Natives.” Before delimitation and forest regulations, MacKinnon contends, “Africans had unrestricted access to forest.”<sup>64</sup> The ZLDC cut off Africans ability to voluntarily migrate to crown forests and to a large extent within reserve forests. The ZLDC cut off *kholwa* and exempt Africans’ ability to buy land outside the reserves and forced ties with the local chief. The ZLDC encapsulated Africans within their chief’s ward, requiring an application to move to another chief.

While the Anglo-Boer War saw a lessening of restrictions, once the Brits defeated the Boers in 1902, restrictions were tightened. By 1932, according to MacKinnon, “The state . . . ensured the chiefs were under no false assumptions about their purely consultative role in the administration.” The Minister of Native Affairs, E.G. Jansen warned the chiefs in Natal and Zululand that “this being a constitutional country after all, the final say rests with Europeans.”<sup>65</sup>

MacKinnon asserts that the ZLDC made a serious effort to provide sufficient land to Africans. Given the pressure imposed by white Natalians to allocate large tracts of land for commercial farming, the commissioners were pushed between their desire to do right by Africans and meeting the demands of their constituents, the white settlers. In the end, Africans lost much land, as well as many venues for voluntary rural-rural migration across the land.

MacKinnon concludes that Africans were “left with communal land rights in a series of marginalized reserves.”<sup>66</sup> This marginalization of land, he asserts, undermined the ability of Africans “to accumulate or control capital produced on the land.”<sup>67</sup> This author adds: the ZLDC also undermined the ability of Africans to migrate as the need arose.

INSERT: Figure 4. Photo from the doorway at Podwane Peak . . . nearly 360 view of gumtrees

### **THE NATIVE ECONOMIC COMMISSION (HALLOWAY COMMISSION) 1930-1932**

The main resource for understanding the state of rural-rural migration before the advent of BA is the 1930-32 Native Economic Commission (Holloway Commission). The 9000 plus pages of the unpublished hearings produced by this Commission were divided into fifteen subjects.<sup>68</sup> The fourth subject was 4. NATIVE MIGRATIONS, which included the subcategories: 4.(1) rural to urban areas; 4.(2) inter-rural areas; and 4.(3) economic effects.

This author is particularly concerned with 4.(2) inter-rural areas migrations. Dr. Holloway’s witnesses described 17 instances of inter-rural areas migrations for the commission.<sup>69</sup> One particularly salient deposition was that of van Rensburg labeled “Transfer from tribe to tribe,” in which commission member Mr. Lucas asks, “They [Natives] are shifting from one location to another?”<sup>70</sup>

van Rensburg: Quite a lot of them.

Lucas: Does that mean that a tribe moves from one location to another?

van Rensburg: Not a tribe, but individuals.

Lucas: I am not sure of the position, but do they set up new tribes and then get a location?

van Rensburg: No, they get the one tribe; you have a member living in one tribe there transferring his allegiance from one to another, and he goes there.

The qualitative statement “Quite a lot of them” is not reliable to provide the true scale of ongoing rural-rural migration. Surely, the quantity of such migration was much less than in precolonial times, and, to those government administrators, it was likely that any ongoing migration was more migration than they viewed as desirable to occur.

Rather, the pertinent portion of van Rensburg’s testimony for this paper is “you have a member living in one tribe there transferring his allegiance from one to another, and he goes there.” Despite the obstacles posed by the 1904 ZLDC demarcation of reserves, rural Africans in 1930 still found a way to practice rural-rural migration when circumstances dictated.

Along with van Rensburg’s testimony and that of other resident magistrates and *amakhosi* at the Native Economic Commission hearings in 1931-32, it is clear that individual rural Africans could still practice voluntarily rural-rural migration between chiefs, so long as they could rely on family members who already resided under the new chief to ease the process of migration. The Bantu Authorities Act 68/1951 would finally end the ability of the common African to voluntarily migrate between chiefs.

## **BANTU AUTHORITIES AND THE HARDING OF MODERN CHIEFTAINSHIP**

The author's prior work on Bantu Authorities has shown that, under apartheid, the system of BA completed past regimes efforts to curtail African mobility. In the establishment of a tribal authority (TA), the commissioner codified the name of the "tribe," codified the irregular boundaries of the "tribe," amalgamated and renamed "tribes" as needed into one "tribe" for ease of department administration, and collected the names of the councilors for Pretoria's approval with the amount based on the number of tax-payers. All of this data was sent to the regional office who then forwarded the application to Pretoria, the head office. When approved, the new tribal authority was gazetted. The intense codification of tribal authorities rigidified the role of chieftaincy and the chiefs' relationship to their subjects, requiring rural Africans to seek permission from the commissioner for voluntary rural-rural migration.<sup>71</sup> The author asserts that "Essential to separate development was a system for confining Africans to specific wards under specific chiefs and BA was such a system."<sup>72</sup>

By codifying Africans as members of specific tribes, the state rigidified the identity of Africans and eliminated their personal agency in matters of migration, based on the colonizer's constructed identity of the other. BA specifically curtailed voluntary rural-rural migration by its: a) coordination with the Abolition of Passes Act 67/1952; b) requisite listing of ethnicity on the Reference Book; c) codification of an African's homeland based on ethnicity; d) identification of surplus Africans with the destination homeland for endorsement out of urban areas; and e) containerization of all Africans, rural and urban, under a specific chief in a specified Bantustan. Contrary to its name, the Abolition of Passes Act further restricted African mobility by replacing racial limitations on mobility with tighter ethnic limitations to that same effect.

Much like previous systems demarcated boundaries for bureaucratic control, BA demarcated “subjects” for ease of administration and control of the indigenous people. Although contemporary local municipality councilor elections in wards offer an avenue of democracy, ultimately the individual inkosi does not change unless he/she is deposed or dies.

As Aninka Claassens writes, “In KwaZulu-Natal there were insufficient funds to hire the IEC to monitor and support the elections. Yet, the IEC [Independent Electoral Commission] ballot boxes and other equipment were used, creating the impression that the elections were properly monitored and run by the IEC.”<sup>73</sup> Having attended a councilor election meeting in reserve no. 9, which was held at the *inkantolo* (traditional courthouse) of the local tribal council, in the presence of the inkosi and *izinduna* (headmen), the author attests to the presence of the IEC. However, the councilors who were elected, this author noted, at the next meeting of the traditional council were marginalized.

Rural Africans of today technically possess the right to migrate as their mobility is no longer legally restricted. But this author has witnessed how their ability to do so is still practically non-existent, due to poverty, unemployment, and ties to their allotment of land, if they have one, under modern structures of traditional rule. Effectively, the only means that the common rural African retains to affect change in the uneven power structure between subjects and amakhosi are instituting a prolonged court case or violence.<sup>74</sup>

Today as before, land is the tool used by the government, intentionally or not, to tie rural Africans to chiefs. This control over communal land by amakhosi has distorted traditional rule and destabilized the relationship between chiefs and common rural Africans. But as *urban* Africans have the right and ability to choose between one apartment or another, given financial

constraints, so too should *rural* Africans retain the right and ability to voluntarily migrate between *amakhosi*. In short, the common rural African should *not* be limited to residing on the communal land held by their present inkosi. Rather, under legitimate circumstances, they must be able to seek assistance from the government in migrating to a different rural area under a different inkosi. If rural Africans are empowered to choose between amakhosi, this choice inscribes a democratic component to modern chieftaincy and reinforces the bond of reciprocity between chief and subject.

The “rural dilemma” for the state over how to administer and fund the former reserves can be approached from two sides: democratizing chieftainship and empowering the common rural African. The two work in tandem much like a teeter-totter. The amount of grant funding is determined by a market economy driven by the interchange of “goods” (just rule and appropriately applied authority) between the seller (chief) and the buyer (subject). In funding the Africans’ ability to migrate, this market economy levels the playing field and puts chiefs in the position of competing with other chiefs for the business and loyalty of rural Africans.

Norman Etherington argued in a recent debate that:

One of the transitions that take place over time is the relationship to chieftainship and belonging to people, which is connected to land and land ownership. Prior to the advent of surveying and titling of land ownership, unlike in South Africa, in other places like West Africa, chieftaincy is not ever defined in terms of land.<sup>75</sup>

This author asserts that, in order to return to the original relationship of *reciprocity* between chief and subject, the predominance of land allocation in the role of modern chieftaincy must be offset

by formally facilitating voluntary rural-rural migration as a means of recourse for unhappy subjects.

It is through explaining how this hardening of chieftaincy occurred in the past and its legacy in the modern system of chieftaincy that this author's prior work informs our understanding of what has transpired since 1994 in regards to traditional rule. And it is through empowering rural Africans to pursue voluntary rural-rural migration today that tradition rule may be adjusted to mitigate the ill-effects of this legacy and return a sense of democratic agency to the rural African people.

## **CONCLUSION**

Debates over rural economic models, for example, modes of production and land use, have not brought satisfactory answers on how to meet the democratic needs of rural citizens. In the past, the colonial and apartheid regimes worked to tie roaming Africans to chiefs through bestowing upon chiefs the powers of communal land allocation. But Europeans retained power over this communal land by inculcating alienation, and, therefore, retained the power to control the "native" population. Land policy was the tool by which the colonial office curtailed the democratic aspects of chieftaincy that had made this form of traditional rule so successful in precolonial times. Particularly, two gradual processes intertwined to freeze the common rural African's ability to voluntarily migrate between chiefdoms:

- 1) The process of co-opting chieftaincy by making chiefs subservient to the central government, and

- 2) The process of eliminating choice amongst rural subjects by curtailing migration and tying them to reserves.

These two processes changed the original native rule into the bastardized “traditional governance” structures of today that would actually be *unrecognizable* to a native inhabitant of Zululand in the early 1700s. The author argues that the current rural poverty is seeded not only in colonial and apartheid policies but in the lack of representation of the common rural African at CODESA (Convention for A Democratic South Africa) as only the rural elite attended.

And although more land allocation for the rural Africans of today would surely help, it is the strict tie that rural commoners still experience to the land and the chief that prolongs the ill effects of decades of colonial rule. However, this author strongly feels that title deeds are not the answer, as shifts in farming practices toward greater scale and consolidation will surely encourage rural Africans to sell off newly acquired land to the highest bidder, local or international.

Rather, this author posits that funding the ability of rural Africans to voluntarily migrate between chiefs is key to the solution. To this end, the Department of Traditional Affairs (DTA) could institute a grant application process for individual rural Africans seeking to migrate between chiefs. The application would need to identify an eligible applicant’s level of need, present inkosi, and preferred destination inkosi. Such a grant should provide funds to compensate the applicant for improvements to the current land upon which they reside, to aid in the cost of moving, and to give an economic incentive for the new inkosi to allocate land to the applicant. Also, as popular chiefs retain more and more adherents, the government should seek to apportion new land (where possible) to those chiefs for them to allocate amongst their growing base of

“subjects,” thus offsetting the land-use impact of voluntary rural-rural migration. Upon offering such incentives to the destination inkosi, chiefs would compete to offer better services, as they would seek to grow their base of “subjects,” which would simultaneously inculcate a democratizing element into chieftainship.

Furthermore, such funding would position rural Africans as investors in the rural economy, as they would have the means to allocate their time, effort, and capital under the rule of a chief who is responsive to their needs. By positioning rural Africans in such a manner, they would have greater control over their own financial well-being, thus empowering them to demand responsiveness of their current chief (or go elsewhere).

As Etherington contends, “Prior to the advent of surveying and titling of land ownership, unlike in South Africa, in other places like West Africa . . . chieftaincy is not ever defined in terms of land. It was not the land you controlled but the people who recognized you and brought you your authority.”<sup>76</sup> In short, the power of the common rural African to choose which chiefly authority to recognize, through the “belonging” aspect of chieftaincy, must be reinvigorated if conditions in the former reserves are to improve substantially.

The rural dilemma for the state can be resolved organically, if choice in migration is returned to the people, and if the necessary funds are provided to support the practical implications of such choice. In the past, chieftainship was most successful at serving the needs of subjects when it was structured as a market economy, where chiefs used the means to wealth accumulation at their disposal to compete for the allegiance of more and more subjects. The current incarnation of chieftainship allows amakhosi to focus on personal wealth accumulation at the expense of the common rural African. Voluntary migration is the main non-violent tool that

history offers to curb this excess of chieftaincy and restore the incentive for “peaceful” competition between chiefs. “One thing that has changed over the past 200 years is the connection [of chiefs] to land and land ownership . . . then chieftainship begins to get hardened into a system.”<sup>77</sup>

By supporting the ability of common Africans to practice voluntary rural-rural migration, the true patterns of indigenous society can return in a manner that co-exists with the modern form of chieftaincy that was designed to serve the interests of colonial then apartheid governments. Funding the choice to migrate between chiefs empowers the rural commoner and engenders competition between chiefs for support, which is the core aspect of democracy.

Many obstacles today, including the entrenched poverty of the former reserves, obstruct the resuscitation of voluntary rural-rural migration as a practice for common rural Africans. However, to improve the quality of life of common rural Africans, this author asserts that voluntary rural-rural migration must be brought back as the standard means of recourse for such Africans to democratically make their voice heard within the current system chieftainship.

Finally, this author recognizes many figures of traditional rule for their work to preserve Zulu land, culture, and identity in the face of a system of BA that was unfairly skewed in favor of other interests. However, this author also asserts that it is unlikely for conditions under chieftaincy to improve until the system is adjusted to re-introduce the democratic aspect of voluntary rural-rural migration and to provide financial support for worthy applicants. So this author asks today’s leaders of the Zulu people to embrace this proposal with the friendly spirit with which it is intended.

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## NOTES

1. WITS History Workshop Book Launch - *Bantu Authorities: Apartheid's System of Race and Ethnicity*, 22 June 2022.  
[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pzi05PKgw6o&list=PLgy-Io-hbLbkR\\_U3DTQSEedut6v\\_YhScM&index=14](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pzi05PKgw6o&list=PLgy-Io-hbLbkR_U3DTQSEedut6v_YhScM&index=14)
2. N. Etherington, "The Origins of 'Indirect Rule' in Nineteenth-Century Natal," *Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory*, 47 (Oct. 1976): 11-21.
3. M. Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996). See Ch 3, "Indirect Rule: The Politics of Decentralized Despotism."
4. A. Adepoju, 1998. "Linkages between Internal and International Migration: The African Situation," *International Social Science Journal*, 50, 157 (Sep 98): 387-395, 387.
5. J. Laband, *The Eight Zulu Kings: Shaka to Goodwill Zwelithini* (Johannesburg, Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2018).
6. N. Etherington, "Putting Tribes on Maps," in *Mapping Colonial Conquest: Australia and South Africa* (Crawley, WA: University of Western Australia Press, 2007). N. Etherington, ed., 79-101, 91. Etherington is Emeritus Professor of History at the University of Western Australia. He has written widely on the history of Southern Africa, the British Empire and European Imperialism. He is a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia, the Royal Historical Society (UK), the Royal Geographical Society (UK) and a past president of the Australian Historical Society. In 2014 he was made a Member of the Order of Australia for service to history and the community.
7. Laband, *The Eight Zulu Kings*, 29.
8. A. S. MacKinnon, "The Impact of European Land Delimitations" MA thesis for University of Natal, Durban, 1990. Additionally, without getting into the *mfecane* debate, scholars accept that groups did migrate to Natal to avoid Shaka's wars.
9. To establish a new TA required the district commissioner to submit, for Pretoria's approval, the name of the chief, the councilors, and the ward boundaries, before gazetting the new TA. In the process, the Department's surveyors generally demarcated new boundaries for the chief's ward.
10. Interview with interim chief Mjabuliseni Dube on 25 Nov 2012 at Ongoye, KZN, South Africa. When Dube was a child his people had use of their side of the nearby lake. When Europeans wanted the full use of the lake, his people were pushed south and no longer had access to the sea ending a fishing/mollusk economy in addition to agricultural. During apartheid the land where a great portion of the Dube people lived was expropriated for the new township to serve Richards Bay labor, eSikhawini, causing overcrowding in reserve no. 10 that spilled over into the Mkhwanzi ward of no. 10.
11. M. Gluckman, "The Rise of a Zulu Empire," *Scientific American* 202, No. 4 (April 1960): 157-69.
12. *Ibid.*, 160.
13. *Ibid.*
14. *Ibid.*, 158.

15. *Ibid.*, 158-161.
16. *Ibid.*, 158.
17. *Ibid.*, 162.
18. Cited in E.A. Eldredge, *The Creation of the Zulu Kingdom, 1815-1828: War, Shaka, and the Consolidation of Power* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014).
19. Gluckman, “The Rise”, 161.
20. J. Lambert, “Chiefship in Early Colonial Natal, 1843-1879,” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 21, 2 (Jun., 1995): 269-85.
21. *Ibid.*, 278.
22. WITS History Workshop Book Launch - *Bantu Authorities*. N. Etherington, panelist
23. Lambert, “Chiefship in Early Colonial Natal,” 270-272.
24. *Ibid.*, 272.
25. *Ibid.*, 272. Lambert cites: South African Archival Records, Natal No. 5, Records of the Natal Executive Council (Cape Town, 1964), Lieutenant-Governor to Secretary of State, 30 December 1858, 263-264.
26. Lambert, “Chiefship in Early Colonial Natal,” 271.
27. *Ibid.*, 272.
28. *Ibid.*, 273.
29. WITS History Workshop Book Launch - *Bantu Authorities*. N. Etherington, panelist.
30. Lambert, “Chiefship in Early Colonial Natal,” 274.
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Ibid.*, 277.
33. *Ibid.*
34. *Ibid.*
35. *Ibid.*, 278.
36. *Ibid.*, 279-80.
37. Etherington, “Putting Tribes on Maps” in *Mapping Colonial Conquest*, 79-101, 91.
38. *Ibid.*, 88, 94-96.
39. V. Ehrenreich-Risner, *Bantu Authorities: Apartheid’s System of Race and Ethnicity*. (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2021), 50-3.
40. Etherington, “Putting Tribes on Maps” in *Mapping*, 88.
41. N. Etherington, “Writing History on Maps” in *Mapping Colonial Conquest*, 127.
42. Ehrenreich-Risner, *Bantu Authorities*, 2021, 180.
43. Etherington, “Putting Tribes on Maps” in *Mapping*, 94.
44. *Ibid.*
45. Map cited in Etherington “Writing History on Maps” in *Mapping*, 126, 142.
46. Ehrenreich-Risner, *Bantu Authorities: Apartheid’s System of Race and Ethnicity*, 2021, 26, 74-82. N. J. van Warmelo, *A Preliminary Survey of the Bantu Tribe of South Africa* (Pretoria, Government Printer, 1935). Union of South Africa, Department of Native Affairs, Ethnological Publication, Vol. V. Cited in N. Etherington, “Putting Tribes on Maps” in *Mapping Colonial Conquest*, 94-95.

47. A. S. MacKinnon, Ch 3 MA thesis, "The Impact of European Land Delimitations and Expropriations on Zululand, 1880-1920," University of Natal, Durban, Department of History, 1990, 142, 154.
48. For a discussion of the removals of the non-Dunn Zulu from Reserve 7A, see V. Ehrenreich, *Bantu Authorities*, 2021, Ch 4, 179-202. Also see Ehrenreich-Risner, 2018.
49. MacKinnon, Ch 3, "The Impact of European Land Delimitations and Expropriations on Zululand, 1880-1920," 148.
50. *Ibid.*, 149.
51. *Ibid.*, 142.
52. *Ibid.*, 165.
53. *Ibid.*, 142, 148.
54. *Ibid.*, 156.
55. *Ibid.* The commission believed that "to free such people from all tribal control would be fraught with dangerous consequences."
56. *Ibid.*, 156.
57. Cited in MacKinnon, "The Impact of European Land Delimitations," 143. Colonial Office, Colony of Natal, original correspondence (C.O. 179) Vol 212/21864, confidential, 7 June 1900, Saunders Report.
58. *Ibid.*, 150.
59. *Ibid.*, 152.
60. *Ibid.*, 155. Umlalazi District was changed to Mthunzini District by Proclamation 16 of 1907 due to the confusion in names with Umlazi township in Durban.
61. MacKinnon, "The Impact of European Land Delimitations," 156. Zululand Lands Delimitation Commission (ZLDC), 46.
62. MacKinnon, "The Impact of European Land Delimitations," Ch 3, 157-8.
63. *Ibid.*, 162.
64. *Ibid.*, 162-3.
65. A. S. MacKinnon (2001). "Chiefly Authority, Leapfrogging Headmen and the Political Economy of Zululand, South Africa, ca. 1930-1950." *Journal of Southern African Studies* 27, 3, Special Issue for Shula Marks: 567-590, 574.
66. *Ibid.*, 165.
67. *Ibid.*, 167.
68. Native Economic Commission 1930-1932, evidence and memoranda (Holloway Commission). University of Cape Town, Jagger Library, Herbst (Secretary of Native Affairs) Papers, Collection Number: BC 79 E1.
69. *Ibid.*, A1.2.4, 4.
70. *Ibid.*, 377.
71. Ehrenreich-Risner, *Bantu Authorities*, 2021, 8-9.
72. *Ibid.*
73. Aninka Claassens "Analysis of Recent Laws and the Legacy of the Bantu Authorities Act" 5-17, 7. in *Custom, Citizenship and Rights: Community Voices on the Repeal of the Black Authorities Act*. July 2010 Monica de Souza & Mazibuko Jara, eds. ISBN 978 0

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74. KwaZulu-Natal Rural Women's Movement has won a landmark judgment, against the Ingonyama Trust. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wH6R0dWWZE0>

75. WITS History Workshop Book Launch: *Bantu Authorities*, Etherington quote.

76. *Ibid.*, Etherington quote.

77. *Ibid.*, Etherington quote.