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_Bantu Authorities in Mtunzini District, KwaZulu:
Forces for Apartheid Removals 1951-1986_

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Bantu Authorities in Mtunzini District, KwaZulu: Forces for Apartheid Removals 1951-1986

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In Mtunzini District, KwaZulu, the system of Bantu Authorities, created by the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act No. 68 and enhanced by the 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act No. 46, played a decisive role in forced removals. The usual reasons for removals were homeland consolidation, betterment schemes and clearance of ‘black spots’. But the removals in this study occurred for other reasons and within ‘Native’ Reserves often to locations on the same reserve. Each removal involved the system of Bantu Authorities, comprising white officials of Bantu Affairs Commissioners and Bantu authorities of traditional rulers who acted as both collaborators and as resisters. The system of Bantu Authorities was apartheid’s mechanism for control in the rural areas, and upon the requisite listing of homelands on reference books, indirectly in the urban areas. Except for radical historians who focused on the gaps between reality and rhetoric in the policy of separate development, scholars before majority rule steered away from the topic in fear of legitimizing the Bantustans. Additionally with the notable exception of the studies of Ivan Evans and Robert McIntosh which engage with the bureaucracy of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development, scant literature exists on the administrative aspects of the system of Bantu Authorities although Marxist studies of the system’s affect on labor do occur. To join the emerging literature which addresses the gap, this micro study seeks to explore the structure and the officials, black and white, of the system of Bantu Authorities through its role in removals in Mtunzini District, KwaZulu 1951-1986.

The Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development (BAD) in South Africa issued a circular containing the following statement at Pretoria in 1962.

... when it is realized that the success of the Government’s policy of separate development is largely, if not entirely dependent upon the success of the system of Bantu Authorities, the importance of leaving no stone unturned in order to ensure that all Bantu
[a]uthorities will . . . fulfil[1] the functions for which they were established and become the effective and dynamic bodies which they should be, cannot be too strongly stressed.¹

In Mtunzini District, KwaZulu, the system of Bantu Authorities played a role in forced removals. Removals of blacks for clearance of ‘black spots’ or for homeland consolidation were the norm under apartheid.² But the removals in this study occurred within the native reserves to other locations in the same reserve. The Zulu words for ‘Bantu Authorities’ are ukuphathwa (to be administered) kwemincele (boundaries). The system of Bantu Authorities brought tightened controls on fencing of land designated for farming or for grazing, dipping fees and culling of cattle, and more taxation for the common Zulu. But the most painful memories of the amazulu of the system of Bantu Authorities in Mtunzini District were forced removals or ukususwa ngendluza seconded only by the bitter memory of wearing a dompas then later the reference book (after the 1952 Natives Abolition of Passes & Coordination of Documents Act No 67).

What was the system of Bantu Authorities and how did it function in removals in the Native Reserves of KwaZulu (Zululand)? Additionally, what role did the Bantu authorities, the rural traditional black elite, play in these removals? Were the Bantu authorities collaborators or resisters or a mixture? The European officials of the system of Bantu Authorities are the voice of the archive. A researcher must listen closely to hear the voices of the Bantu authorities, the black chiefs and headmen, in the fissures where the system malfunctioned or in the few letters written by amakhosi (chiefs) to the local Bantu Affairs Commissioner (BAC).

The Bantu Affairs Commissioner

¹ Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development, Republic of South Africa (RSA) ‘Bantu Authorities: Development and Function of.’ General Circular No. 17 of 1962. File No. F55/1. Pretoria 2 July 1962. I regret the use of the derogatory term ‘bantu’ which I chose to retain as it was the historical name of the department.
‘... machines beget machines.’

Some commissioners viewed their position as a job; some as a god-given duty; and some BACs were African advocates working within the system of discrimination which had began long before D.F. Malan came to power in 1948. The local BAC might take the side of the Bantu authorities as he had on-going relations with these traditional rulers and could put faces to the African names. For example, the Mtunzini Native Commissioner O.C. Oftebro in 1956 fought for the £4,326 of revenue from gum trees on Reserve 8 to be deposited to the Cambini Tribal Authority Trust account to encourage development in Inkosi Mathaba’s ward. In reply, the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner (CBAC) in Natal, after consulting with the Secretary for Native Affairs, rebuked the commissioner stating that the lands belonged to the South African Native Trust (SANT). Section 8 of the Native Trust and Land Act 1936 required that funds should be deposited to the SANT Account, not the Cambini Tribal Trust Account. Oftebro replied that in depositing the funds in the Cambini Tribal Trust Account, ‘I acted on my own initiative,’ and added the challenge that the ‘Trust Regulations ... should be amended so ... revenue accrued in a native reserve is credited to the tribal authority concerned’. Nevertheless, Oftebro complied and transferred the funds to the SANT. In 1961 CBAC Wood at Pietermaritzburg argued with BAD’s Secretary K.A.E. Heinze in Pretoria in support of a grant for road maintenance undertaken by the Cambini Tribal Authority which had been denied. Concluding his minute, Wood requested guidance from the Secretary as to what comprised a ‘full motive submission’ which Heinze had stated was the reason for the denial of the grant.

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5 PMB N11/1/4 Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner (CBAC) PMB to Secretary for BAD dated 18 October 1961. First name for Wood is not given.
Bantu authorities

Predictably, the Zululand BACs had their favorites and, as it was part of their job, recommended loyal and competent Zulus to the CBAC in Natal for positions of chiefs and headmen, especially during a violent succession dispute. W.J. Ndaba in the Law and Commerce Department at the University of Zululand said that blacks couldn’t jump fast enough to apply as replacements for deposed rulers. He concluded, ‘There are always people willing to betray others for money and you must remember that these people were very poor’. I seek to identify the actors in the system of Bantu Authorities and the African perspective on its implementation which emerged through the cracks and how these individuals and attitudes combined to effect removals in Mtunzini District. While traditional rulers stood to gain economically from the system of Bantu Authorities, historian M. R. Mahoney asserts, correctly, black elites often lived in poverty which made categories of black ‘middle class’ and black ‘elites’ meaningless.

Historiography

The historiography of the system of Bantu Authorities is generally oriented toward the labor control apparatus of the department (i.e. influx control), not its bureaucracy. One study on the structure of native administration is Ivan Evans’ examination of the banal aspects of the Department of Native Affairs (DNA), which he argues ‘leached oppression into civil
administration’ of the everyday lives of Africans. The contradictions of the department’s call to meet opposing capitalist and Broderbund dictates created ongoing tensions of the conflicting needs for cheap black labor and for white racial purity. With intensified influx control as a mechanism for capitalists to have their cake and Afrikaner nationalists to eat it too, the system of Bantu Authorities sped ahead, despite pothole after pothole. Evans calls the DNA a ‘state within a state’ which emerged in the 1950s with subsequent diminution of the legislature and the judiciary. While he covers the historiography of the British DNA and its revitalization under apartheid, this paper covers only the National Party’s revamping of the DNA into the Department of Bantu Administration and Development (BAD) with an eye to its role in forced removals from 1951-1986.

R. McIntosh calls Evans’ study the best volume on ‘the internal workings of the apartheid bureaucracy in the 1950s’. McIntosh differs with Evans’ conclusion that it was only after the unexpected acceptance of Bantu Authorities by the traditional rulers in the United Transkeian Territories General Council that the department took seriously its system of Bantu Authority. McIntosh argues that the DNA files evince an intensive program of propaganda and finally violence to force traditional rulers’ acceptance of Bantu Authorities. Although I concur with McIntosh, I believe that Evans’ argument opens unexplored territory on the historiography of the system of Bantu Authorities. Further Evans argues that the DNA’s relationship to coercion in 1950s is the character of ‘administration’ itself and not the DNA’s response to opposition. Evans asserts that the telling attribute of the department was not its apartheid violence but ‘its dispersal into everyday life [of Africans]’ which is valid for the 1950s but, I contend, not the later

apartheid period. The system of Bantu Authorities created and enforced the bureaucratic apparatus that underpinned petty apartheid; an apparatus which evolved into the grand apartheid of separate development of the 1960s and ignited rural protests that set the stage for the violent police state of the 1970s and 1980s.

Through the complicity of the rural African elite or ‘Bantu authorities’ in enforcing homeland policy, BAD in the 1950s used what Evans termed the character of ‘administration’ as a qualified form of repression to coerce consent from rural Africans. The correspondence between BAD’s Bantu Affairs Commissioners of the District Office (DO) and the Head Office (HO) bears out his assertion. Evans argues for an ‘illusion of decentralization’ where BAD projected ‘decentralization’ of Africans through ethnic fragmentation while conversely intensifying the centralization of BAD’s bureaucratic structure to erode the gradualist policies of assimilation of the prior British and Union regimes. A reference to the hierarchy of the department (see Fig. 4) belies apartheid’s heavy bureaucratic hand where the former regimes had opted for a laissez-faire approach towards ‘Native’ policy. Interestingly, Prince Mangosuthu Buthelezi quipped in our interview that the National Party was very good at book-keeping. This centralization of BAD allowed for greater state control of the rural area and a demise of the authority of the local native affairs commissioners or ‘man-on-the-spot’ system of the prior regimes. Through centralization of BAD, the system of Bantu Authorities was the blood which delivered to every department of the Nationalist body politic white control of black South Africans. Firstly, the system focused the State’s aggressive infiltration into the rural area through collaboration of often reluctant traditional rulers. Secondly, the system infiltrated the urban area through the State’s requirement for blacks to list ethnicity on Reference Books which enforced retribalization. Despite ubiquitous images in the media of the South African Police with

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sjamboks quelling township ‘riots’, the quiet, hidden killer was the codified, punctual, official paper trail of the system of Bantu Authorities. Hendrik Verwoerd was the Minister of Native Affairs before he was the Prime Minister. It was a case of ‘Native’ policy driving State policy.

Insert Fig 1. Map of Mtunzini District

Mtunzini District, KwaZulu

Mtunzini District lay in the top half of the Natal Sugar Belt and was situated on the coast of the present KwaZulu-Natal Province just south of Richards Bay and some distance north of Durban. It was bordered on the north and the south by the Mhlatuze and Tugela Rivers, respectively, and on the east by the Indian Ocean. Mtunzini District was the most densely populated district of Zululand, 440 square miles of gum trees, sugar plantations and four ‘Native’ reserves.\(^{11}\)

In the time of the Zulu King Cetshwayo, the area which became Mtunzini was ruled by the ‘white’ chief John Dunn. A native commissioner referred to him as the ‘notorious’ John Dunn, perhaps, due to Dunn’s traditional marriages to 47 Zulu women. But it is more likely that the label referred to Dunn’s gun running expeditions and his loyalty to the Zulu King, whose interests coincided with Dunn’s interests until the Anglo-Zulu War. After the 1879 victory over the Zulu Kingdom, the British government divvied up Zululand into 13 kinglets, and Dunn retained his territory, due to his assistance in the war to the British, that consisted of *inter alia* ‘Native’ Reserves 7A, 8, 9 and 10 which encompassed Mtunzini District.

**Table 1. Mtunzini ‘Tribes’ in 1934**\(^{12}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘Tribe’/Surname</th>
<th>Isithakazelo [Praise]</th>
<th>Chief</th>
<th>Reserve area [morgen]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Surname</th>
<th>Amakhosi</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambini [Mbambi praise]</td>
<td>Mathaba [surname]</td>
<td>Somshoko</td>
<td>100 / 1,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dube</td>
<td>Mbuyazi</td>
<td>Magemegeme</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langeni</td>
<td>Mhlongo</td>
<td>Mthengeni</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mathonsi</td>
<td>Dunge</td>
<td>Mgandeni</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mkhwanzani</td>
<td>Ndonga</td>
<td>Nikiza</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpungose</td>
<td>[Ndlovu subclan]</td>
<td>Khuba Siphoso</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nzimela</td>
<td>Mnjuni</td>
<td>Zimema</td>
<td>2,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nzuza</td>
<td>Mahlobo</td>
<td>Muzutyingiwe</td>
<td>1,067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zulu</td>
<td>Ndaba, Ndabezitha</td>
<td>Thethemana</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The district was initially named Umlalazi, then changed in the 1920s to Mtunzini (Zulu: place in the shade) which reified Dunn’s habit of calling meetings with his izinduna (headmen) under a tree by his homestead at Emyoni. Upon Dunn’s death in 1895, the British colonial government appointed Dunn’s izinduna as chiefs with limited jurisdiction in their wards. These amakhosi ruled under the eye of the Magistrate/ Bantu commissioner in Mtunzini. The amakhosi in the Mtunzini District during the apartheid regime, which is the focus of this study, were descendants of these izinduna namely, Cambini (Mathaba), Dube, Mkhwanzani, Mzimela, Nzuza, and Zulu.13 Due to its favorable coastal climate and fertile soil, the apartheid regime removed Africans in Mtunzini District to appropriate land for European use to establish sugarcane plantations, gum tree forests, a game park and a tourist resort, in addition to the reasons covered in this paper.

This study provides an overview of the three removals inter alia which occurred in Mtunzini District under the apartheid regime. Originally, my study was to explore affects of the

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Ehrenreich-Risner  Bantu Authorities in Mtunzini District  10

Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 on the amaZulu of Mtunzini District. But when I mentioned ‘homelands’ or ‘bantustans’ the terms, while known to traditional rulers, were unfamiliar to the common Zulu. In our interview Anthropologist Mpilo Pearl Sithole asserted that ‘people experience these policies whether it is Bantu Authorities Act . . . , at a very practical level.’ She wisely suggested that I approach my exploration of the system of Bantu Authorities ‘via the discourse that is practical on the ground and talk about land reform’. Not surprisingly when I had interviewed Zulus about the affects of apartheid, forced removals had topped the chart, with passes a close second. Subsequently, I chose to focus on removals.

In the Mzimela ward of ‘Native’ Reserve 9 religion was a force for expropriation. On the outskirts of the Ngoye Forest in the Mkhwanazi ward of ‘Native’ Reserve 9, higher education was a force for removals. Inappropriate demarcation was a force for removals of indigenous Zulus in the oddly designated ‘Native’ Reserve 7A allotted to the colored community of John Dunn’s descendants. In each instance, the system of Bantu Authorities and its Bantu authorities played a decisive role in forced removals. The Bantu authorities of traditional and appointed black leaders acted as both instigators and go-betweens and as resisters of the system of Bantu Authorities created by the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act No. 68 (BAA), the foundation for the homelands legislated by the 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act No.46 (PBSA).

1951 Bantu Authorities Act No. 68

In 1948 the Nationalist Party (NP) with its platform of apartheid became the new government of South Africa. In 1951 the NP government pushed through, despite a contentious parliamentary debate, the BAA which created the machinery for the system of the Bantu Authorities. The BAA

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14 I interviewed Dr. M.P. Sithole in her office in the Department of Community Development and Social Work at the University of KwaZulu-Natal on 11 February 2013.
restructured the Native Affairs Department with Hendrik Verwoerd at its helm and renamed it the Department of Bantu Administration and Development (BAD). Utilizing its tentacles of black chiefs, headmen, and white Bantu Affairs officials, the octopus of Bantu Authorities reached into the rural areas enforcing betterment schemes, pass laws and forced removals.\textsuperscript{15} Through gerrymandering the boundaries of the old British reserves and through removals for homeland consolidation, the PBSA built on the infrastructure of the BAA and established the Bantustans with their promise of ‘independence’ to offset the loss of South African citizenship for blacks.\textsuperscript{16} B. Lapping defined the Bantu authorities of the Bantustans as apartheid’s offer to rural blacks of their own ‘equivalent to the Tudor monarchs’.\textsuperscript{17}

The BAA created a system of approved existing or appointed Bantu authorities into mechanized tiers of indirect rule as scaffolding to support the NP’s future plan of grand apartheid or homeland development. The \textit{Report of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development} states, ‘Chiefs and headmen are appointed by the State President and the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, respectively, under the provisions of section 2 of the 1927 \textit{Native Administration Act No. 38}.’\textsuperscript{18} Traditional rulers formed the three-tiered ascending pyramid of the tribal (one clan), regional (a group of clans), and territorial authorities (which evolved into a Legislative Assembly for each ethnic group) that fenced blacks in the reserves economically, legally, socially, and ethnically as shown in Figure 2.

The system of Bantu Authorities was apartheid’s lynchpin for the control of Africans in the rural areas, a control which later seeped into the urban areas when blacks were required to identify their ethnicity on their reference books. The petty apartheid of Bantu Authorities intruded into every aspect of the daily lives of rural Africans. The yearly reports of BAD nuance the uses of the term ‘Bantu Authorities’ through capitalization. Bantu Authorities (capitalized ‘A’) refers to the personnel (black and white), system and bureaucracy of the department; while Bantu authorities (lower case ‘a’) refers solely to the African elite traditional leaders.19 BAD’s Report for 1960-1962 clarified that ‘all chairmen and members of Bantu authorities [lower case ‘a’] are Bantu’.

They [chiefs and headmen or Bantu authorities] are the Government’s representatives in the areas concerned [native reserves] and as such have to ensure, in general, that effect is given to all laws, instructions and requirements concerning the administration and control of the Bantu in their areas. In addition they must attend to such matters as public health, registration of tax-payers, occupation and cultivation of land, crime and control thereof, protection of individuals and property, etc.20

Pretoria assigned the role of watchdog to Bantu authorities who became the state’s thermostat for regulating conditions in the rural areas, which obviated the need for a BAC to leave the comfort of his office.21 Although the BACs held the power, they had to consult with chiefs and headmen

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19 Union of South Africa. Report on the Department of Bantu Administration and Development for the period 1st January 1958 to 31 December 1959, UG 51/1960. On 1 October 1959 the names of the Department was changed from “Native Affairs” to Bantu Administration and Development.
21 Personal email 2013 from S. Werner, COGTA, on his interview with D. Gilfillan (Former Land Claims Commissioner), on 1 June 2001.
to ensure that the system worked.\textsuperscript{22} But it was the Bantu authorities who had direct control over their subjects: a control which was ‘accepted, unless those decisions created problems’ for either the subjects who then appealed to the BACs or for the BACs who then fined or deposed non-compliant Bantu authorities.\textsuperscript{23}

Bantu Authorities in Mtunzini District

An Unizulu security guard whom I interviewed in 2013 spoke of the great pain evoked by the repressive laws of apartheid. He exclaimed, ‘We were crying under unbandlululo [Zulu: apartheid]; we are still crying’.\textsuperscript{24} The January 1963 issue of the BAD’s propaganda publication \textit{baNtu}, covered the inauguration on 12 November 1962 of the Mehlwesizwe Regional Authority with \textit{iNkosi} Magamageme Dube as Chairman and M.C. Crossman, Mtunzini Bantu Affairs Commissioner, in attendance.\textsuperscript{25} The chief speaker C.G. Nel, Commissioner-General for the Zulu National Unit, outlined the duties of the Regional Authority per CBAC J.O. Cornell, namely: obtain a portion of funds for development of the region, assume responsibility for collection of taxes for all married men and the dog tax, and ensure the agricultural yield is of a high standard.

Nel said the purpose of [Bantu] authorities was ‘simply progress’. Due to the lack of available land, Bantu authorities must plan carefully their national economy and limit the number of subsistence farmers. The remainder were to live in towns for which ‘the Government had plans for a building scheme where blacks could buy their own houses and establish their own businesses with Bantu Investment Corporation assistance. Mr. Nel assured the Zulus that the

\textsuperscript{22} Personal email from South African historian Gerhard Mare, 20 November 2013.
\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Hansard}. 6/3/56, 1992. Minister of Native Affairs Hendrik Verwoerd was forced to give an accounting of deposed \textit{amakhosi} and \textit{izinduna} by Mr. Lee Warden and the reasons for their deposition. Mtunzini’s Reserve No. 9 and 10 \textit{Inkosi} Muntongenakudla “nothing to eat” Mkhwanazi was the first on the list in 1951 and was deposed for inciting a riot. The state replaced him with his head \textit{induna} Mbulalani Mnuzzemvuze Mnguni.
\textsuperscript{24} I interviewed a Palane Security Guard from Forest Inn on 12 December 2012 at Pondwana, KZN.
\textsuperscript{25} Department of Bantu Administration and Development. ‘A New Regional Authority’ \textit{baNtu} January 1963, p. 56.
Government would provide schools. Nothing would be done without their consultation and co-operation.

On first glance the system of Bantu Authorities appeared to benefit the rural African with its offer of free schools (mission schools were already free) and entrepreneurial assistance (a few were financed but downsized when their prices competed with white businesses). But as the presentation by the Commissioner-General to the Mehlwesizwe Regional Authority of two tractors, a station wagon and a road grader to serve the sprawling Mtunzini District showed, the support given was too little to provide for a viable economy in the impoverished rural areas. Notable was Nel’s highly dubious statement that nothing would be done without the Zulus co-operation; even more suspect was BAD’s desire for African progress as the count-on-one hand number of businesses funded by the Bantu Investment Corporation evinced. When the plans for a building scheme materialized in 1977 into the rural township of Esikhaweni on the perimeter of Reserve 10, Joyce Mbambo, a resident of Esikhaweni, stated in our interview that the people living in the area were removed. Initially BAD did consult with the Bantu authorities but if co-operation was not forthcoming, inkosi (chief) Impiyezintombi Mzimela asserted, ‘the whites just did what they liked’.

Gazetted in 1961, the Mehlwesizwe Regional Authority consisted of five ‘tribal’ authorities: the Cambini (Mathaba), Dube, Mkhwanazi, Nzuza, and Zulu Tribal Authorities. According to the Mtunzini District Record Book, the sixth clan in Mtunzini District, the Mzimela [or Nzimela] clan, did not ‘accept’ Tribal Authorities until 1967, although Impiyezintombi Mzimela contends that his people never ‘accepted’ Tribal Authorities. The Mehlwesizwe

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26 I interviewed inkosi Impiyezintombi Mzimela at Ntshidi School in Reserve 9 on 24 December 2012.
27 Mtunzini District Record Book, 1950-1965, Office of the Magistracy, Mtunzini, KwaZulu. Under the Nationalist regime each District in the reserves was required to keep records updated in its district record book. I interviewed
Regional Authority was answerable to the KwaZulu Territorial Authority which became in 1973 the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, the parliament of the KwaZulu Government in the KwaZulu homeland with Mangosuthu Buthelezi as its Prime Minister.

The apartheid state struggled to get the traditional rulers on board the Bantu authorities train. The *amakhosi* and their *izinduna* resisted knowing their people’s distrust of *abelungu* (whites) and hatred for what they viewed as the newest system of oppression. The BACs headed by M.D.C. de Wet Nel, former Deputy Minister to Verwoerd and the Secretary for BAD (later the Minister of BAD), took the unprecedented step of visiting the rural areas and speaking with the traditional rulers and their people to garner ‘acceptance’. In the main, the BACs were received with suspicion and often hostility. The *amakhosi* and *inzinduna* who did ‘accept’ the system, meaning agree to establish a Tribal Authority in their area, often feared for their lives. In 1960, the new Mtunzini Bantu Affairs Commissioner AD Thompson wrote to the CBAC in Natal that the five Tribal Authorities of Mehlwesizwe Regional Authority existed on paper only. These traditional rulers who had ‘agreed’ to establish Tribal Authorities were reluctant to commence functioning as ‘the chiefs and their councilors dare not mention tribal authority activities. They live under constant threat of physical violence’.  

Some Bantu authorities asked for guns to protect themselves from their own people who were angered by their Tribal Authority’s new levies, enforcement of betterment schemes and influx (and afflux) control. In these meetings, what the Bantu authorities repeatedly asked the BAC was when they would get their monies.


Although amakhosi had the power to allot communal land in their wards, the state forbade them to accept funds for the land. After succession fights, the right to land or Permit to Occupy (PTO) was the biggest cause of rural violence. In 1977, the re-instated iNkosi Muntongenakulda Mkhwanazi was killed by a Zulu over disputed land rights.

. . . give the Zulu nation more territory . . . urgent is the position of our people from the farmlands. Not one day passes without some of our people from the farmlands approaching us [chiefs] for sites and arable lands, and yet we are forbidden by officials of BAD from granting people land as our areas are at full capacity.29

Forced removals of urban blacks or surplus rural blacks on white farms to the homelands led to intensified overcrowding in the rural areas which undermined the power of traditional leaders in regards to land allocation as disputes increased.30 Former Acting Inkosi Mjabuliseni Dube in Reserve 10 stated in our interview that he had recurrent dreams in which he cried because with expropriations he no longer had land to give to his people.31

The system of Bantu Authorities had its finger on the pulse of the traditional rulers. Although no land was left for allotment, land could be transferred if the holder of the PTO had failed to make use of the soil, a grey area where amakhosi and izinduna could give transfer preference to relatives or those offering payment. If a subject reported to the BAC that his chief had taken monies for a parcel of land, the chief was fined, a method the BACs used to keep the

black rulers in line. Despite this threat, the chiefs and headmen seemed to continue to take payment for communal land from subjects who were either satisfied, despite payments, with their plot of land or were too frightened to report the infringement.\textsuperscript{32} The rural elite’s rationale may have been that payments for land were compensation for the loss of \textit{khonza} fees.

Mjabuliseni Dube explained that without this customary tribute the chiefs were poor which resonates with Mahoney’s assertion on the ambiguity of categories for black elites.\textsuperscript{33} To examine the system of Bantu Authorities this study explores three case studies of removals in Mtunzini District.

\textbf{Religion - Force for Removal}

Problems arose in ‘Native’ Reserve No. 9 in 1952 when \textit{inkosi} Lindelihle Mzimela, a follower of the black prophet Shembe, crossed paths with a Lutheran minister in Mtunzini District.\textsuperscript{34}

Scholars have cited betterment planning while others ‘black spot’ removals as the top cause for resettlements in South Africa.\textsuperscript{35} I have not seen any literature which cited religion as the impetus for removals. Yet, removals, expropriations or ‘resettlements’ often came in the form of redrawn boundaries, as in the case of the Mzimela Ward in Reserve 9, the largest in Mtunzini District which stretched from the Umlathuze River to Eshowe and to the Ngoye Range. After a succession dispute following the death of \textit{Inkosi} Ntshidi Mzimela in 1945, Lindelihle Mzimela had succeeded his father and was installed in 1946. In 1952 a new Lutheran minister at the Ongoye Mission Station in Reserve 9 complained to the Mtunzini Magistrate that Chief

\textsuperscript{32} In Mathaba’s Ward it was rumored that an \textit{induna} had taken monies for land allotment but when questioned by the Mtunzini BAC the people involved stated that neither the induna nor the chief had taken monies.

\textsuperscript{33} Interview by author with Acting Chief Dube.

\textsuperscript{34} SAB File No. 389/53 Prime Minister’s Office Minute dated 14.5.1952. sgnd D.f. Malan and G. Jansen withdrawing boundaries of the “Mzimeli” Ward in reserve 9 set out in G.N. no 1512 of 1942 to exclude Ongoye mission from the area.

Lindelihle Mzimela, a lay leader of the Shembe Church, was undermining the Christian missionary project.\(^{36}\) Subsequently, the government redrew the boundaries of the Mzimela territory ‘so as to exclude the Ongoye Mission [Homestead] from the area’.\(^ {37}\) Portions of the Mzimela area were allotted to the neighboring Reserve 17 in Inkosi Biyela’s Ward and the Ongoye Lutheran Mission Station was added to the Mkhwanazi Ward in Reserve 9 of Acting Inkosi Mbulaleni Mnguni, likely a Lutheran like the ruling Mkhwanazi clan.\(^ {38}\)

Isaiah Shembe (c. 1867-1935) founded the Church of the Nazarites and was considered a prophet (as the biblical prophet Isaiah) and a great church leader in South Africa during his lifetime. Historian Daniel Magaziner spoke to Chris Mzoneli, a former Lutheran seminarian, who explained that, ‘African-ness . . . is like in the Old Testament . . . and always favored the prophets: because Isaiah and his peers did not reflect a ‘secular division’.\(^ {39}\) Magaziner submits, and I agree, that Black Theology in South Africa under apartheid (versus Black Theology in independent Africa) was not a look backward but a look ahead, ‘which focused not on the past but on the challenges of the now’.\(^ {40}\) Through their belief in the prophet Shembe, the Bantu authorities like Lindelihle resisted the spiritual hold of the Union and the hegemony of the Nationalist regime which dispensed a PTO for only approved religious sects and then only within a five-mile radius of the nearest government-recognized school.

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\(^{37}\) SAB: D.F. Malan and G. Jansen to the Governor-General dated 14.4.1952, page 1 of typed manuscript for new boundaries of “Mzimeleni” Tribe. See also SAB CNC 389/53 from D. F. Malan to Governor-General 14.5.52 recommending substitution of 1942 boundaries for redrawn 1952 boundaries of “accompanying schedule” which *inter alia* “exclude the Ngoye Mission from the area.”

\(^{38}\) In our interview Inkosi Mzimela stated the reason for Munto Mkhwanazi’s deposition was his inciting of his people (Mkhwanazi) at the wedding in Port Durnford to kill the Mzimelas. The state replaced Munto with his head induna Mbulalani Mnvuzemvuz Mnguni.


\(^{40}\) Ibid, 80.
G.C. Oosthuizen contended that ‘the emphasis on Zulu tradition, with the centrality of ancestor worship in Shembe's doctrine’, was a great attraction for the amaZulu (Zulu people).\textsuperscript{41} The July festival at Nhlangakazi, or what Oosthuizen called the Mount Sinai of the Nazarites, combined the worship of Jehovah and the royal ancestry of the Zulu nation. In July 2011 when I attended the festival outside Durban, the Zulu men as they descended the mountain wore traditional Zulu warrior leopard skins complete with assegais. They were accompanied by young children in white dresses who played long golden horns such as the Israelites used to call the people together combining the Old Testament with Zulu culture. While religion was a force for removal, religion was also a force for resistance.

\textit{Inkosi} Impiyezintombi Mzimela elaborated on the 1952 revision of boundaries in which his people ‘lost a great deal of land’.\textsuperscript{42} Impiyezintombi believes that the negative attitude that the Bantu commissioners had toward his grandfather, Ntshidi Mzimela, his father, Lindelihle Mzimela, and the Mzimela people was due to their Shembe faith.\textsuperscript{43} But by 1956 the other five clans in Mtunzini had ‘accepted’ the system of Bantu Authorities; \textit{inkosi} Lindelihle Mzimela resisted until 1967 which undoubtedly affected BAD’s attitude toward Lindelihle.\textsuperscript{44}

In 1956 W. F. Coertze responded to the Minister of Native Affairs’ request for a report on the progress of the Bantu authorities in Mtunzini. He stated that ‘there “may” be a total of six tribal authorities established’ which he then listed. First on the list was the ‘Nzimela’ [Mzimela],

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{42} I interviewed \textit{inkosi} Impiyezintombi Mzimela at Ntshidi School in Reserve 9, KwaZulu-Natal on 24 December 2012. During Fulbright-Hays stays in 2011 and 2012-13 in Mtunzini District, I conducted interviews with local amazulu and amakhosi on the effects of the Bantu Authorities in the district. Additionally my findings are drawn from the source documents in the National Archives of South Africa (Durban Repository, Pietermaritzburg and Pretoria), the archives of University of KwaZulu-Natal (Howard) including its Killie Campbell Africana Library, the archives of Northwestern University, and the isiZulu collection at the University of Zululand.
\item \textsuperscript{44} SAB CNC 208/362 (4) Secretary for Native Affairs (T.F. Coertze) to the Chief Native Commissioner, PMB, 4.9.56 RE: Bantu Authorities: Mtunzini.
\end{itemize}
but Coertze noted that ‘the native commissioner has received no representation. The natives apparently could not be persuaded to have an [Tribal] Authority.’ He added” ‘I suspect the native commissioner has given his attention to the matter.” 45 The six tribal authorities that Coertze wrote (in Afrikaans despite prior correspondence in English) to the Minister ‘may’ be established were:

1. Nzimela
2. Dube
3. Mkhwanazi
4. Zulu
5. Nzuza
6. Cambini

The Bantu Commissioner of Mtunzini may have given his attention to the matter of guiding Mzimela into the fold but documents are absent on the issue. Impiyezintombi asserted that his father hid in the bush to prevent assassination by his brother who the government promoted as successor due to Lindelihle’s refusal to accept Bantu authorities. Ostensibly, the Bantu authorities were supposed to include consultation and acceptance by black clans and the archives document BAD’s attempts, often unsuccessful, to garner acceptance from local ‘tribes’. 46 Mzimela contended in our interview that ‘none of the amakhosi accepted Bantu authorities, the whites just wrote that [they did]’. Thereafter, when the commissioners discussed Bantu authorities in Mtunzini District, no mention is made of Mzimela. Historian E. Gunner writes

45 SAB CNC W. F. Coertze to Minister of Native Affairs 14 December 1956.
46 Mr. Nel and his staff visited local rural areas in the push to gain acceptance for Bantu Authorities before the promulgation of the 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act.
‘eviction was a weapon which the missionaries could and did use when anyone on a Mission Reserve was found to have encouraged or joined the Nazarites’.\textsuperscript{47} Perhaps the Mtunzini Commissioner feared the spread of Shembe in his district and preferred to keep \textit{Inkosi} Lindelihle, as an entrenched Shembe leader, at a distance.

### Education - Force for Removal

The University of Zululand, known locally as UniZulu, lies in the Mkhwanazi Ward of Reserve 9 to the east of the Ngoya Forest Reserve. The Mkhwanazi people share Reserve No. 9 with the Mzimela, Nzuza and Zulu clans and split Reserve No. 10 with the Dube clan. In 1959 the Nationalist regime removed indigenous Zulu people to make way for the building of this university which the NP was pushing as a benefit of separate development. UniZulu was to be apartheid’s international show piece of progress, built to prove to Europe and North America the benefits of separate development and to counter hostile criticism. UniZulu’s doors opened to Zulu students in 1960.

The Nationalist regime passed the \textit{1959 Extension of University Education Act No 45} which made ‘it a criminal offence for a non-white student to register at a hitherto open university without the written consent of the Minister of Internal Affairs’.\textsuperscript{48} With the promulgation of the \textit{Act}, separate ‘tribal colleges’ were built for non-white students. When blacks were told they could no longer freely attend white universities, protests ensued. UniZulu would be the university for the \textit{amaZulu} whether the \textit{amaZulu} wanted a university or not . . . and some did not because any program instituted by the Europeans was suspect.


\textsuperscript{48} Lapping \textit{Apartheid: A History}, p. 135.
The events leading up to the opening of the university exemplified the workings of the system of Bantu Authorities in the reserves. The local actors for the system of Bantu Authorities were the Mtunzini BAC Crossman and the Chief Surveyor, Isherwoood, with the local Bantu authority being the Magistrate-appointed Acting Inkosi Mbulaleni Mnguni. It was this blatant collaboration of white and black officials in the system of Bantu Authorities that angered the people of Dlangezwa, the name of the area under construction. Firstly, the building of a college might be desirable but the amaZulu in the Mkhwanazi Ward of Reserve No. 9 were kept in the dark about the reason for their removals. Secondly, the system of Bantu Authorities incorporated the participation of their acting chief Mnguni without consultation of the people. Thirdly, even though approached by Zulus as to the reason for the removals and for the erection of buildings, Mnguni did not share the purpose with his people. As a result when the secret was slowly revealed, resentment surfaced and people said it was not good to have the university.

To counter this resistance, the Department of Bantu Education named the main hall Bhekazulu Hall and invited the leading Zulu Bantu authority, the Zulu Paramount Chief (King) Cyprian Bhekazulu, a known BAD collaborator, to address this discontent at the opening of the University of Zululand. Cyprian told his people that the university was a good thing for the Zulus; but he did not mention the bad thing attached to building of Ongoye, namely, the barring of Zulus from other universities. Like its subsequent act, the 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act No. 46, which eliminated parliamentary representation of Africans, the 1959 Extension of University Education Act No 45 gave with one hand a university and took with the other hand the ability to attend any other university.
Thulani John Mbuli, wrote on the creation of the University of Zululand and the history of the Mkhwanazi chief of Reserves 9 and 10, Muntongenakudla (Munto) Mkhwanazi. After his arrest in 1951 for inciting a riot, Munto was deposed and head induna Mbulanleni ‘Mvuzemvuze’ Mnguni was appointed by the Mtunzini magistrate, without consultation of the people, to rule as Acting Chief. The Mkhwanazi People questioned why they were not consulted; why the university was kept a secret from them; and why Mvuzemvuze Mnguni protected this secret. Mnguni did not consult the Mkhwanazi Tribal Authority, which was the norm. According to the Mkhwanazi elders, Mnguni acted alone. Conversely, the Mnguni elders the researchers interviewed contended that Mnguni did consult with Munto who gave his approval of the plans. What is problematic is that Kandisa, which was partially demolished with the construction, was Munto’s royal palace. Would the deposed chief agree to the uprooting of his ancestral home? The Mkhwanazi elders told Mbuli that the acting inkosi would meet with the surveyor Isherwood and the magistrate at the Ongoye Primary School, where he (Mnguni) was principal. They would get in a car and drive to the proposed site of the university. By watching where the land was measured and whose farms were confiscated, the people could envision the changes and rumors started. One of the elders, Mkhwanazi A, explained, ‘People were confused when the white man measured, first with his arms stretched over their homes and land which was Mkhwanazi land. This was a talking matter amongst ordinary people to people of the kingdom of the Mkhwanazi’. Along with Kandisa, the Mkhwanazi royal palace, households from adjacent chieftaincies (Dube, Mathaba, Mhlongo, and Biyela) were also demolished. Another Mkhwanazi elder told Mbuli that ‘the first UniZulu building was white and small. This was a building for the


50 Mbuli, *Ucwaningo*, p. 91.
security that looked after the building material. This building is at the entrance next to a big tree, the giraffe tree. This tree belonged to my father’s brother who was vacated because of the building of the university’.  

Great care was taken by the BAC Crossman and Mnguni to keep the project secret. When the people asked Mnguni about the progress of the project [UniZulu], a few of the Mkhwanazi elders contended that ‘we were threatened with being sent to prison’, so much for BAD’s policy of consultation with the Africans. Mbuli’s study lists the homesteads and families that were removed for the university and attests that the elders and the children raised at these homesteads remembered the removals.  

The people had no way of knowing that great pressure had been put on BAD with the promulgation of the *Extension of University Education Act of 1959* to complete the Zulu university, or at least a section of it, before the end of 1960.  

The elder Mtethwa which Mbuli interviewed stated that ‘What sickened them was that the white man’s measurements included their dead (their cemeteries)’. In the former reserves, people still use their homestead as cemeteries to bury their dead. The disregard shown by the system of Bantu Authorities and by the local Bantu authority Mnguni for the ancestors of the Zulu people affected the whole community. Bitter resentment continues between the Mnguni and the Mkhwanazi families as a succession dispute plays out today in the high court in Durban.

**Demarcation - Force for Removal**

In September 1934 the Chief Native Commissioner H.C. Lugg wrote to the Mtunzini Magistrate C.S. Williams in regards the Dunn Reserve:

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51 Ibid.
52 Mbuli, 92.
53 Mbli, 91. Ndaba in our interview 21 November 2012 at his office in the Law and Commerce Department at Ongoye stated that the library was a showpiece that upon opening held no books.
54 In 2012, I attended a funeral of an *induna* who was buried on his homestead.
Will it be possible to remove the Natives into some other Reserve w/o meeting with serious opposition? The Minister will be here on the 18th proximo and one of the matters to be discussed will be this thorny question.55

Land demarcated within a Native Reserve for a coloured community was the cause for removals of indigenous Zulus from Reserve 7A, the Dunn Reserve, in Mtunzini District. The anomalous construction by the Zululand Lands Delimitation Committee 1902-04 of the ‘Native’ Reserve 7A for the colored children of the late John Dunn on land where Zulus had lived for generations created what the Chief Native Commission Lugg labeled in 1934 as ‘a thorny question’. In 1900 the Natal Government had predicted that the communities of Zulu and ‘half-castes’ would develop at the same pace and congeal over time and consequently they labeled the Dunns, descendants of John Dunn and his 47 Zulu wives, as natives. Simultaneously, the Natal government opted to protect the rights of indigenous Zulu who had lived in the area. The thorny ‘Native’ question, which riddled various colonial officials for the next eighty years, lay in these two objectives which became mutually exclusive over time.

Adjacent to ‘Native’ Reserve 7A (Dunn Reserve) and south of Mtunzini Village, the Cambini ‘Tribe’ boasted prime coastal land in its Reserve No. 8.56 Inkosi Chakide Mathaba ruled in the area despite the presence of several other smaller clans, namely the Mpungose, Matonsi, and Mhlongo, but these other amakhosi resided in nearby Eshowe while Mathaba lived on Reserve 8. When it was proposed to excise the 10,000 acres of Dunn Reserve from the Trust Lands, the Union realized the difficulty in finding compensatory good land. Instead the

55 PMB 39/4 CNC HC Lugg to CS Williams Magistrate and Native Commissioner 20 Sept 1934 re: Dunn Reserve.
56 Zululand Lands Delimitation Commission 1902-1904, Government Printer, Pietermaritzburg, 1905. In the Commission’s report the Dunn Reserve is noted as 7A; later correspondence notes it as 7A.
indigenous Zulus where notified in 1912 by the Mtunzini Magistrate to remove or ‘shift off’ the Dunn Reserve to Reserve 8; the process of removal continued for decades.

The thorny question of relocating indigenous Zulus resurfaced with the 1950 Group Areas Act and entered the spotlight with the 1951 BAA. If the Dunns were coloureds how could they, under the Group Areas Act, reside in a ‘Native’ Reserve? Conversely, if the plakkers were Zulus didn’t they belong in a ‘Native’ Reserve? The Secretary of BAD suggested three alternatives for ‘Native’ Reserve 7A: remove the Dunns; remove all the Zulus; or retain the status quo. On 7 April 1956, the Secretary for Native Affairs CB Young responded to the CNC’s request for boundary description for the Cambini Tribal Authority under Acting Chief Mabhenguza Mhlongo (acting for Chief Bhekamafa Mathaba, a minor). Before any Bantu authorities could be installed, for which the government was pushing, announcements had to be published in the customary Government Notice and two newspapers. Young advised the CNC ‘as the area of Cambini Tribal Authority is concerned I would advise you that according to all available information in this office Dunn’s Reserve consists, in fact, of the whole of Reserve No 7(a). The position regarding the area of the Cambini Tribal Authority can therefore be met by mentioning only Reserve No. 8 and the land known as Redhill’. The Cambini Tribal Authority area was proclaimed as ‘consisting of Native Reserve No. 8 and the surveyed land . . . known as Redhill and vested in the South African Native Trust’. How then could the state force the people of Cambini Tribal Authority who had relocated from the Dunn Reserve off of Redhill?

With the advent of apartheid and its separate development, surplus urban and rural workers or ‘refugees’ were ‘resettled’ in the ‘homelands’, which caused further overcrowding in Reserve 8. Hence, Inkosi Mathaba looked towards unoccupied ‘native’ areas adjacent to Reserve

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57 SAB 208/362 (4) SNA C.B. Young to CNC PMB re: Est of Tribal Authorities: Mtunzini District, 7 April 1956, emphasis in original
8 such as Red Hill Farm to allot land to his people. Red Hill, or clearly a portion of it, was SANT land and could be released for black settlement if the government were to honor the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act to enlarge the reserves from 7 percent to 13 percent of South African land.\(^5^8\)

The government talked of creating a sugar cane plantation but for various reasons the land remained unused. Red Hill was partially in Reserve 7A but the majority of the land lay on the east/coastal side of the railroad tracks opposite Native Reserve 8. The Chief Land Surveyor Isherwood in 1980 remarked that a number of homesteads had been established years prior on Red Hill Farm, and ‘it was only recently when kraals were erected very close to the Tugela Mouth Township that things came to a head’.\(^5^9\)

With apartheid’s creation of the ethnic national states or ‘homelands’ came a form of self-government, the KwaZulu Government Service, which had to be included on discussions relating to the former Native reserves. Two of KwaZulu’s departments, namely the Chief Minister and Finance and the Office of the Secretary for the Interior in Ulundi, were added to the list of various Bantu Affairs Commissioners to be consulted. CNC H. J. Backer complained to the KwaZulu Secretary for the Interior A.M.J. van Rensburg of the ‘high handed manner’ in which Chief Chakide Mat[h]aba and his induna allowed people to settle on Red Hill Farm and inquired how the new government was going to rectify the matter. Concluding his letter, the CNC reiterated to van Rensburg that the ‘squatters’ would be removed by October 1980. Before 1980, some Zulus must have moved voluntarily from the Dunn Reserve to Red Hill Farm as the Surveyor Isherwood remarked above that kraals had been established years ago on Red Hill.\(^6^0\)

\(^{58}\) The Native Trust and Land Act (Act No. 18 of 1936) ruled that the reserve land for blacks was to be enlarged from the 7.13% of the Natives Land Act of 1913 to 13.6% of the total area of South Africa. Until the 1980s this quota was not met.

\(^{59}\) Cited in the Secretary for the Interior’s letter of 25 July 1980 to Director-General for Co-operation and Development, Pretoria. The flack came from whites in Tugela Village who were concerned about property values.

Independent of the BACs, one of Chief Mathaba’s *induna* began allotting land to Zulus on the trust land. In 1979 the Mtunzini BAC paid a surprise visit to the Bantu authorities in ‘Native’ Reserve 8. After approaching the *induna*, Kancinza Zikhali, who refused to speak to him, the BAC proceeded to Chief Chakide Mathaba’s homestead. Bluntly, Mathaba told him that he did not know of his *induna*’s actions but that he approved of his allotment of building sites to the people on what the chief contended was part of his Reserve No. 8. Hearing of this from the Mtunzini Commissioner, the CBC H.J. Backer in Natal bristled at Mathaba’s ‘high-handedness’. He authorized the Mtunzini BAC to send a form letter to the ‘squatters’ charging them with residing illegally on land belonging to SANT. The Mtunzini BAC sent the notice to the ‘squatters’ giving the people three months to vacate. Alternative accommodations would be provided at the Bulwer Trust farm in Stanger District. He signed the eviction notice ‘yours affectionately, Bantu Affairs Commissioner, Mtunzini’.

But it would not be so easy for the system of Bantu Authorities to evict the Zulus in their own Zulu ‘homeland’ with their own KwaZulu Government Service. In 1980, the followers of Chief Mathaba met at the KwaZulu headquarters in Ulundi with S.T.C. Ngcobo and KwaZulu’s Secretary of the Interior, T.C. Memela.  

The deputation complained of arrests by the South African police; those unable to post the bail remained in gaol. The deputation averred that Redhill was not a trust farm but part of Mehlesizwe Tribal [Regional] Authority and part of Reserve 8. The deputation’s great-grandparents had resided in the area and they never paid rent. Memela wrote to the CBAC who instructed the Mtunzini BAC to extend the eviction notice a month but then to evict ‘all blacks’ from Redhill. But the ‘squatters’ remained and the CBAC enlisted the aid, to no avail, of Mangosuthhu Buthelezi, Prime Minister of KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, who merely advised Memela to caution Mathaba.

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In December of 1986, Redhill 12238 was ‘unexpectedly transferred from the South African Development Trust to KwaZulu per Government Gazette No. R232, dated December 1986.’ The memorandum of A’Bear, Chief Planner, stated that ‘with the transfer of Redhill, the Blacks from adjacent areas began settling on Red[h]Hill’ drawing protests from both Whites at the settlement at Tugela Mouth and Coloureds at nearby Mangete. His ‘planning recommendations’ included ‘an eventual coming together of all interested parties in the district in order that an overall development framework be adopted for the area’. This transfer was one of few victories for the KwaZulu ‘homeland’ government.

Conclusion

The need to keep the South African Native Trust (SANT) ratio of land a constant sharply constrained the Nationalist Party with regard to removals within the reserves, as the government was required to find an equal amount of land to resettle the people. With the passing of the 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act and once the Tomlinson Report judged apartheid as an impossibility given the lack of land and its poor quality in the reserves, homeland consolidation became a good reason for exchanging fertile reserve land for dry, rocky land. Homeland consolidation became more about white consolidation and ‘black’ spot removals in the rural areas with the secondary goal of herding blacks into the reserves and onto rural perimeter townships like Esikhawini, near industrial sites such as Richards Bay. Additionally, a change occurred in the late 1950s when it became evident that white farmers would not move or exchange land to facilitate homeland consolidation – even though they believed in the ideology.

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of separate development. Hence, the only ones who could be moved were Africans, leaving separate development more of an ideal than a reality.

Aimé Césaire’s phrase ‘those who have known voyages only through uprootings’ speaks of the lives of these rural amaZulu in Mtunzini District who lived under the threat of the bulldozer, the GG lorries and the SAP demands to ‘Move’!⁶³ In this paper I have argued that the reasons for removals in Mtunzini District intersected with the system of Bantu Authorities and involved its traditional rulers, the Bantu authorities. In some cases the Bantu authorities were collaborators, as in the building of the University of Zululand. At other times, the Bantu authorities stood by their people to retard their removal as shown in the case of Redhill. And in unique ways the Bantu authorities sought to lead their people towards a new mental territory through adherence to a non-government sponsored, African-initiated religion. I sought to reveal the structure in which these intersections occurred between European Bantu Commissioners and the African Bantu authorities and in the process tease out from archival documents and interviews wherein the responsibility for the removals lies.

Mainly, I have argued that the system of Bantu Authorities and its cadre of Bantu authorities was the mechanism which directed and enforced apartheid in the rural area which, with legislation requiring identification of ethnicity on reference books, spilled over into the urban area. Bantu Authorities was the heart of apartheid which codified discrimination. No doubt, it was the system of Bantu Authorities which should be held responsible; but a system requires people for it to function. I invite scholars to dust off archival documents and to investigate the bureaucracy of Bantu Authorities without which apartheid could not have functioned. Is it coincidence that upon becoming Prime Minister, B. J. Vorster, who had spent 20

months imprisoned during the Second World War as a Nazi sympathizer, created the Bureau of State Security (BOSS)? The system of Bantu Authorities was never popular, and it needed enforcement. If trouble arose in the rural areas, the Bantu authorities were directed to contact BOSS. Was Verwoerd’s promise that the system of Bantu Authorities would function in consultation and with consent of the Bantu authorities and the ‘Bantu’ people nothing more than a smokescreen? The gap between propaganda and reality is wide, and many scholars have passed over the Bantustans without examining them closely. This paper aims, however, not to valorize the system of Bantu Authorities but to call for analysis of its primacy in the ideology and the practice of separate development, that is, Grand Apartheid. Since the BAD Secretary told us, ‘... the Government’s policy of separate development is largely, if not entirely dependent upon the success of the system of Bantu Authorities ...’, perhaps we should take note.65

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Fig 1. Map of Mtunzini District
**Figure 2. Hierarchy of Bantu authorities**

- **Territorial Authority**
  - **Regional Authority**
    - **Tribal Authority**
      - **Bantu authorities**

- **KwaZulu Territorial Authority**
  - **Mehlwesizwe Regional Authority**
    - **Tribal Authorities - Cambini, Dube, Mkhwanazi, Mzimela, Nzuza, and Zulu**

**Mtunzini District Bantu authorities**
Figure 3: Alpheus Veleshowe Zulu receiving certificate of appointment as inkosi for Zulu Clan from BAC Van Rooyen in Mtunzini on 5 April 1968. Mtunzini District Record Book
Fig 4. Structure of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development
Published by RSA, Department of Bantu Administration and Development, R.P. 78/1964